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  Legislative authorization for the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999 was renewed in 
October of 2006. One of the cited justifications for implementing mandatory reporting was 
that the voluntary reporting system for the slaughter cattle cash market was unable to provide 
accurate and timely market information. We extend the spatial market analysis literature by 
developing a methodology for detecting distortions in spatial relationships across related price 
series. Using spatially linked regional markets, we compare state-level mandatory price-re-
porting data to the U.S. Department of Agriculture voluntarily reported state data to determine 
if the spatial relationship between price-reporting mechanisms was disrupted by market dis-
tortions prior to implementation of federal mandatory price reporting. We found no empirical 
evidence of system failure; therefore, we conclude that market thinning or noncompetitive be-
havior had not reached the level necessary to disrupt the ability of the voluntary price-report-
ing system to provide timely and accurate price information. 
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On October 1, 2006, mandatory price reporting 
(MPR) of livestock prices was renewed in the 
United States (the White House 2006). Prior to 
renewal, the legislation was allowed to expire 
October 1, 2005, under a sunset provision in-
serted into the original legislation passed in Octo-
ber of 1999 (Economic Research Service 2005, 
U.S. Government Accountability Office 2005). 
The MPR system has generated debate among 
producers, politicians, and economists because of 
issues associated with implementation problems, 
unrealistic expectations for improved transparency, 
and market data aggregation (Ward 2006b). 
  The Agricultural Marketing Services (AMS), a 
branch of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, is 
responsible for collecting and disseminating MPR 
livestock market information (Economic Research 
Service 2005). Prior to MPR, these reports were 
prepared from information voluntarily supplied 
by market participants or collected by market re-
porters. Some of these reports focused on local 
and regional cash markets, detailing the quantities 
of different types of livestock products sold, with 
ranges for weights, yields, and grades as well as 
prices. Other reports were more aggregated and 
summarized market activity across a wide geo-
graphic area for a week, month, or year. 
  In this study, we investigate whether the volun-
tary price-reporting (VPR) system’s ability to 
provide accurate and timely market information 
was diminished due to market distortions (e.g., 
Anderson et al. 1998, Koontz 1999, and Azzam 
2003). According to this literature, the movement 
of market participants away from cash transac-
tions in public markets to direct sale cash trans-
actions and alternative marketing arrangements 
(marketing agreements, forward contracts, etc.) 
resulted in a thinning of cash market information. 
The consequence of a thinning of cash market in-
formation as discussed in the MPR literature is 
similar to the concerns raised by Tomek (1980) 
for terminal markets. If thinning markets did re-
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duce transparency in the cash market for slaugh-
ter cattle, then price discovery and market effi-
ciency would suffer. We investigate this supposi-
tion of market distortions disrupting the ability of 
VPR to provide timely and accurate market in-
formation in a smaller regional cash market for 
slaughter cattle. 
 Our  primary  objectives  are (i) to introduce a 
methodology for detecting certain types of distor-
tions in spatial price relationships within a coin-
tegration framework, and (ii) to use this method-
ology to empirically test for the presence of mar-
ket distortions in the VPR system at a regional 
level. We first provide a review of the literature 
and the debate over the perceived failure of the 
VPR system. Next, we define the econometric 
conditions produced by a thinning market effect 
and then discuss how market distortions would 
affect the VPR system’s ability to generate trans-
parency. We then empirically test for the presence 
of distortionary effects during the period just 
prior to MPR implementation. The source for 
mandatory livestock price-reporting data is the 
transaction records on all slaughter livestock sales 
in the state of South Dakota collected for the 19-
month period prior to the implementation of the 
federal MPR. 
  The structure of South Dakota’s livestock in-
dustry, the existence of state-level MPR trans-
action data, and the spatial relationship between 
South Dakota’s feedlot industry and Nebraska’s 
packing industry provide a unique environment 
where the regional spatial market for live cattle is 
divided artificially by state lines. Thus, the spatial 
price relationship between the AMS’s “Nebraska 
voluntary price report” and South Dakota’s man-
datory price report provides an excellent case 





Trends in the Marketing of Slaughter Cattle and 
the Voluntary Price-Reporting System 
 
Increased concentration in both the packing and 
feedlot industries and the use of alternative mar-
keting arrangements (marketing agreements, for-
ward contracts, etc.) have resulted in a movement 
away from terminal market transactions by mar-
ket participants over the last 30 years. In the spot 
market for cattle, the use of public markets (auc-
tion markets, terminal markets, etc.) declined 
from 30 percent in 1977 to 12.8 percent in 2003 
(Grain Inspection and Packers and Stockyards 
Administration 2005). Furthermore, the four larg-
est packers accounted for 83.2 percent of steer 
and heifer slaughter but purchased only 6.9 per-
cent of total cattle slaughter in public markets. A 
number of economists have looked at the issue of 
structural changes in the cattle industry and the 
potential negative effect on price discovery, re-
ducing market transparency, and degrading the 
effectiveness of the voluntary price-reporting sys-
tem (e.g., Anderson et al. 1998, Wachenheim and 
DeVuyst 2001). 
  The government response to declining terminal 
markets for fed cattle was to increase its reliance 
on voluntarily reported transaction information 
for direct sales. During this period, however, di-
rect sales information collected on a voluntary 
basis by government market reporters also began 
to thin. By the end of the 1990s the USDA 
estimated that nationally 35 to 40 percent of all 
negotiated transactions in the fed cattle market 
were not being reported (Agricultural Marketing 
Service 2000). An additional shortcoming alluded 
to in the literature was the AMS’s inability to re-
port on captive supply transactions (marketing 
agreements, forward contracting, and packer own-
ership) occurring in the slaughter cattle market. 
For beef producers, this was seen as a critical 
shortcoming of the VPR system. 
  Concerns were also raised over local market 
transparency. With a decline in aggregate spot 
market volumes, local market coverage by daily 
market news releases became much more sparse. 
For example, in the early 1990s local daily fed 
cattle cash price reports for Kansas and Texas 
were not released for about 10 percent of the days 
due to lack of sufficient trading volume. By year 
2000, the AMS was unable to release 60 percent 
of these daily market reports. With the increased 
volume of cattle moving outside the spot market, 
coverage of these daily market reports became a 
major concern of market participants (Grunewald, 
Schroeder, and Ward 2004). The prospect of a 
public price-reporting system relying on regional 
cash market data that continued to thin had many 
industry participants believing that the VPR sys-
tem had become ineffective. 
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Early Producer Reaction to Mandatory Price 
Reporting 
 
Prior to the implementation of MPR, it appears 
that producer expectations, especially in the feed-
lot sector, were raised to an unrealistic level 
concerning the ability of MPR to improve market 
transparency. Producers appear to have been ini-
tially disappointed with MPR because they per-
ceived a lack of improvement in transparency 
(Grunewald, Schroeder, and Ward 2004, Ward 
2006a). 
  Schroeder et al. (2002) conducted a survey of 
feedlot operators located in the key fed cattle 
production areas of Texas, Oklahoma, Nebraska, 
and Iowa one year after MPR was implemented. 
They found that operator perceptions indicate a 
belief that MPR did not improve regional infor-
mation on fed cattle cash prices and that operators 
indicated a propensity to have a greater reliance 
on private information sources. However, these 
private firms also rely on public price-reporting 
sources for data collection purposes (e.g. Cattle-
Fax, etc.). The survey results reported by Schroe-
der et al. (2002) suggest that feedlot producers 
perceived that MPR reduced market transparency 
at the local and regional level. 
  Grunewald, Schroeder, and Ward (2004) pro-
vide econometric analysis of the Schroeder et al. 
(2002) survey data and concur with the conclu-
sions of Schroeder et al. (2002). Grunewald, 
Schroeder, and Ward (2004) speculated that pro-
ducers’ perception of MPR not increasing trans-
parency suggests that it is possible that the VPR 
system was providing transparency in the cash 
market. Fausti and Diersen (2004) presented em-
pirical evidence suggesting that the VPR system 
was providing transparency in the South Dakota 
cash market for dressed weight steers. Pendell 
and Schroeder (2006) reported that AMS’s aggre-
gate weekly VPR series were cointegrated. These 
studies suggest that producer disappointment with 
MPR may be due to raised expectations based on 
the belief that the VPR system had lost its ability 
to provide timely and accurate market informa-
tion. Ward (2006b) suggests that this initial disap-
pointment has begun to dissipate as both the 
AMS and the industry have adapted to the reali-
ties of the new reporting environment. 
Mandatory Price Reporting: Benefits and 
Concerns 
 
As a consequence of MPR implementation, trans-
parency increased dramatically for captive supply 
transactions (Ward 2006a, 2006b). It is the gen-
eral consensus among economists that the addi-
tion of non-spot market transactions to public 
price reports corrects an important deficiency 
associated with the VPR system. In a recent study, 
Pendell and Schroeder (2006) reported empirical 
results suggesting that MPR had strengthened the 
long-run price relationships between AMS weekly 
regional aggregate reports. 
  The AMS, however, did eliminate a number of 
regional slaughter cattle cash market reports 
(Fausti, He, and Diersen 2003). Fausti, He, and 
Diersen (2003) suggested that these regional re-
ports provided producers with a source of market 
information not available under MPR. In support 
of this conjecture, in the post-MPR period, slaugh-
ter cattle producers in Nebraska, New Mexico, 
and Texas have been instrumental in the develop-
ment of several non-federal regional voluntary 
price-reporting regimes. It appears that these vol-
untary reports evolved to address the timing issue 
associated with “trading windows” for producers 
in local markets. Concern over accuracy of MPR 
reports was raised in a report by the U.S. Govern-
ment Accountability (GAO) (GAO 2005). The 
GAO report indicated that not all transactions re-
ported to the AMS were included in MPR price 
reports, and there were cases of packers not re-
porting transactions. The USDA has indicated to 
the U.S. Congress that it is responding to the 
GAO criticisms (Ward 2006b). 
 
Voluntary Public Price Reporting and Thinning 
Markets 
 
The price-reporting literature identifies a thinning 
cash market as being the likely candidate respon-
sible for the purported failure of VPR to provide 
transparency in the market for slaughter cattle 
(e.g., Azzam 2003). The thinning market argu-
ment asserts that structural change in the packing 
and feeding industries has caused a thinning mar-
ket effect in the public reporting of cash market 
prices for slaughter cattle under the VPR system.
1 
 
1 The concept of a thin market in this context refers to the decline in 
reported transactions as a percentage of total transactions (Tomek 1980). 
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This view basically assumes that Tomek’s (1980) 
thinning market phenomenon was occurring in 
the VPR system, which increases price uncer-
tainty and decreases market efficiency (Anderson 
et al. 1998, Azzam 2003). Ward (2006a, p. 4), 
however, raises the following issue: “A pertinent 
question for livestock and meat markets is when 
does thinning of a market with VPR present such 
a concern over efficiency and accuracy to merit a 
major public investment in a mandatory system?” 
  Fausti and Diersen (2004), using South Dakota 
MPR data on cash sales of dressed weight slaugh-
ter cattle, found empirical evidence of price trans-
parency in the South Dakota cash market for 
dressed slaughter cattle prior to federal MPR. They 
define price transparency as “a market condition 
when all relevant information on transaction prices 
is publicly available to all market participants.” 
They define spatial price transparency as “price 
transparency existing between spatially linked in-
terregional markets.” Their empirical methodol-
ogy adopted a number of concepts on spatial inte-
gration from Barrett and Li (2002). However, 
they did not directly test for the presence of a 
thinning market effect. 
  Our study extends the work of Fausti and 
Diersen (2004) by constructing a theoretical frame-
work for modeling interregional competitive spa-
tial markets and their respective price-reporting 
mechanisms. The theoretical framework permits 
us to propose an empirical methodology to test if 
independent price-reporting mechanisms for spa-
tially linked competitive markets are being dis-
torted by market participants or market condi-
tions. The empirical procedure is then used to for-
mally test for the presence of market distortions 
in the spatial price relationship between the South 
Dakota and Nebraska cash markets for live 






Spatial Market Integration 
 
The literature on the relationship between com-
petitive spatial equilibrium and market integration 
(McNew 1996, McNew and Fackler 1997, Barrett 
and Li 2002) provides a methodology for ana-
lyzing the robustness of price transparency within 
the context of mandatory versus voluntary price 
reporting. Barrett and Li (2002) note that when 
interregional trade is nonnegative, a long-run 
competitive spatial equilibrium condition holds 
when marginal profit from arbitrage activity is 
equal to zero. Under this condition, when trade is 
positive, regional price differentials move “one-
for-one with the costs of spatial arbitrage” in the 
long run (Barrett and Li 2002, p. 293). Market 
integration, however, as discussed in the contest-
able market literature, “implies the transfer of 
Walrasian excess demand from one market to 
another, manifest in the physical flow of a com-
modity, the transmission of price shocks from one 
market to another, or both” (Barrett and Li 2002, 
p. 293). Market integration implies an efficient 
short-run market adjustment mechanism restoring 
a market to its long-run equilibrium condition. 
Barrett and Li (2002) assert that when competi-
tive spatial equilibrium and market integration 
coexist, the market achieves “perfect integration.” 
  Fausti and Diersen (2004) adopted Barrett and 
Li’s definition of market integration to investigate 
the issue of market transparency in the VPR sys-
tem for dressed slaughter cattle. The concept of 
spatial price transparency discussed by Fausti and 
Diersen is analogous to Barrett and Li’s concept 
of “perfect integration.” The necessary conditions 
for the existence of spatial price transparency are 
(i) interregional competitive spatial equilibrium, 
and (ii) interregional market integration. Jointly, 
these two conditions are sufficient for the exis-
tence of spatial price transparency. However, 
Fausti and Diersen fail to formally address the 
empirical issue of directly testing for the presence 
of a thinning market effect. In the model devel-
oped below, a framework is developed to for-
mally test what we call the Thinning Market Hy-
pothesis (TMH). 
 
Regional Mandatory Price-Reporting Regimes 
 
Several states passed MPR regulations prior to 
implementation of federal MPR regulations in 
2001 (Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, and 
South Dakota). The purpose of regional livestock 
MPR laws is to require that all livestock transac-
tions be reported to a designated government 
agency. In the case of South Dakota, it was the 
State Department of Agriculture. In theory, this 
implies that price transparency in the cash market 
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is being provided by the reporting regime. The 
price revealed by MPR (Pt
M) in South Dakota 
(SD) in period t equals the actual weighted aver-
age market price (Pt
SD) for cash sales in period t 








The symbol I denotes that the information set 
contains all transaction data generated in South 
Dakota and collected by the price-reporting agency. 
The variable (ε) denotes a random error occurring 
in the data collection and reporting process. If one 
assumes full industry compliance (complete infor-
mation), then E(εt|It







3 Assuming that the gov-
ernment’s data collection procedures adhere to 
standardized collection and evaluation practices, 
then a unilateral, instantaneous, and complete in-
tegrated relationship between Pt
SD and Pt
M exists 
in the context of a price-reporting relationship. 
The integrated relationship exists if there is no 
systematic component associated with the error 
term. 
 
Voluntary Price-Reporting Regimes 
 
The information set (It
NE) contains transaction 
price information for Nebraska (NE), voluntarily 
reported to the price-reporting agency. The in-
formation set determines the price revealed in the 
VPR system (Pt








NE is the actual market-weighted average trans-
action price in NE, and νt is the random error 
term resulting from random error in the data col-
lection and reporting process. It is assumed that 
the VPR system draws a large enough sample 
when constructing It
NE to be representative of the 
market.
4 Hence, the VPR system is an efficient 
conduit for the transmission of market informa-
 
2 This assumes full compliance with price-reporting regulations by all 
market participants. It is assumed that transaction costs associated with 
price reporting are zero. Accordingly, the intercept term is dropped.  
3 Note that the mathematical operators E and Var are conditional ex-
pectation and variance operators, respectively. 
4 The assumption is that the expected value of collected transaction 
prices is an unbiased estimate of equilibrium price and is consistent 
with Tomek (1980).  
tion on slaughter cattle transactions in Nebraska. 
This implies that E(Pt
V|It
NE)=Pt





that the government’s data collection procedures 
adhere to standardized collection and evaluation 
practices, then a unilateral, instantaneous, and 
complete integrated relationship between Pt
NE and 
Pt
V exists in the context of a price-reporting 
relationship. 
  The requirement for an integrated relationship 
between actual and reported market price is an 
error term that is stationary. Stationarity is im-




2νt. This implies that there is not a 
systematic component affecting the mean and vari-
ance of the error term. 
 
Interregional Slaughter Cattle Production and 
Interregional Spatial Equilibrium: A Simple 
Model 
 
Assume two spatially related regions (SD and 
NE) for the production of slaughter cattle. As-
sume that the NE market has a high level of pro-
duction capacity for producing slaughter cattle, 
has processing facilities, and has a voluntary public 
price-reporting regime. In contrast, SD has a 
mandatory price-reporting regime, no processing 
facilities, and a lower level of slaughter cattle 
production capacity relative to NE. Assume that 
SD produces an excess supply of slaughter cattle 
because of a lack of processing facilities and that 
NE has excess demand for slaughter cattle due to 
processing facilities’ having excess capacity. 
Producers in SD have a choice of selling their live 
cattle to a field representative of a processing firm 
located in NE or selling their cattle in SD to an 
intermediary (independent order buyer). The in-
termediary will assume the risk of delivering the 
cattle to a processing facility in NE and profit 
from arbitrage activity. Therefore, trade in live 
slaughter cattle between SD and NE is unilateral. 
This description is consistent with the production 
and marketing of slaughter cattle in South Da-
kota. There are no modern large-scale commer-
cial beef packing plants in South Dakota, except 
for two plants processing cull cows. A majority of 
South Dakota slaughter cattle are shipped to Ne-
braska for processing. 
  Next, it is assumed that the market for slaugh-
ter cattle is competitive in South Dakota and Ne-
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braska. This implies that opportunities for interre-
gional arbitrage dissipate quickly, and that long-
run competitive spatial equilibrium is consistent 
with zero marginal profit from arbitrage activity. 
This also implies that the cash markets for slaugh-
ter cattle in South Dakota and Nebraska are spa-







where α is the intercept term capturing transac-
tion costs, ψt is the random error term, and E(ψt) 
=0 and Var(ψt)=σ
2ψt. Transaction costs include 
transportation, commission fees for dealers and 
order buyers, pencil shrinkage, etc. 
  Given the interregional spatial market relation-
ship discussed above, it is reasonable to assume 
that an interregional spatial relationship exists 
between the South Dakota MPR price series and 






where “a” denotes the intercept term reflecting 




Empirical Implications of the Thinning 
Market Hypothesis on Spatial Markets 
 
The MPR literature discussing the thinning mar-
ket effect contends that accuracy and timely 
transmission of cash market price information by 
the VPR system was degraded. We assert that a 
thinning market effect will distort the VPR sys-
tem in two ways. First, as a cash market thins, a 
breakdown of the integrated relationship between 
a VPR system and the cask market it is reporting 
on will occur. Second, as a cash market thins, in-
formed market participants are likely to have a 
competitive advantage over uninformed market 
participants, and this asymmetry may result in 
anti-competitive practices. In this case the VPR 
mechanism fails to provide transparency to mar-
ket participants who rely on the VPR system for 
market information. Furthermore, the lack of 
transparency can provide an opportunity for in-
formed market participants to take advantage of 
uninformed market participants. One example of 
this type of anti-competitive behavior discussed 
in the literature is strategic price reporting (Koontz 
1999, Fausti and Diersen 2004). The econometric 
implications of this type of market disruption are 
investigated next. 
  With respect to VPR in Nebraska, a thinning 
market effect will alter the information set and af-
fect the first and second moments of the distribu-
tion of the error term [equation (2)]. This would 





plies that either E(νt|It
NE)≠ 0 or Var(νt|It
NE) 
changes as the content of the information set 
changes. If the amount of voluntarily reported 
transaction data declines over time in Nebraska 
(ceteris paribus), then voluntarily reported prices 
released to the public will exhibit increased vari-
ability. This assumption is consistent with the dis-
cussion of the consequences associated with a 
thinning market (Tomek 1980) for market effi-
ciency, and the discussion found in the MPR 
literature (e.g., Azzam 2003). This implies that 
the variance term in the relationship defined in 
equation (2) will be inflated. As a consequence, 
the variance of the error term in equation (4) will 
also increase, rendering the error term in equation 
(4) nonstationary.
5
  This can be demonstrated by rearranging equa-
tion (4): Pt
M– Pt
V=a +et . Assume that “a” is a 
constant and allow a mean-preserving increase in 
dispersion. The implication of an increase in the 
variance of Pt








V)=V a r ( et). If Var(Pt
V) in-
creases, then Var(et) increases. In this case, linear 
cointegration estimation techniques could fail to 
find a cointegrated relationship between Pt
M and 
Pt
V. The failure to detect cointegration implies 
that the thinning market effect has disrupted the 
ability of the two price-reporting series to reflect 
the competitive spatial equilibrium relationship 
between the cash markets.
6
  Disequilibrium between the NE VPR series and 
the SD MPR series implies that the spatial re-
 
5 The empirical implication of a thinning market effect is analogous 
to heteroscedasticity.  
6 The alternative explanation would be that the South Dakota and 
Nebraska cash markets are not linked by competitive spatial arbitrage. 
However, this alternative is not consistent with the structure of the 
interregional cash markets for live cattle. 
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lationship between the NE cash market and the 
NE VPR series is disrupted. In this case the NE 
VPR is not providing transparency to the partici-
pants in the NE and SD cash markets. However, 
if we verify empirically a cointegrated relation-
ship between the NE VPR series and SD MPR 
series, then we have established that the NE and 
SD price-reporting series reflect the existence of a 
long-run spatial equilibrium relationship between 
the NE and SD cash markets. According to 
Barrett and Li (2002), this is the first condition 
necessary to establish that the NE VPR was pro-
viding transparency to the NE and SD cash 
markets. 
 
Thinning Market Hypothesis and Competitive 
Spatial Arbitrage 
 
Assume that the cash market can become less 
competitive as transparency declines (e.g., Koontz 
1999). One would expect that within interregional 
spatial markets, the farther an area is from the 
market center the less competitive that area be-
comes as transparency deteriorates. Following 
this line of thought, we will relax our underlying 
assumption of competitive spatial arbitrage in the 
SD and NE cash markets. Assume that competi-
tive spatial arbitrage breaks down in the cash 
markets between SD and NE. This implies that 
long-run marginal profit to arbitrage is positive. 
Accordingly, informed buyers of slaughter cattle 
can earn positive economic rent by purchasing 
cattle in SD from uninformed sellers and selling 
them in NE. As the NE cash market thins, non-
competitive practices increase. This implies that 
positive profit to arbitrage increases in the long 
run.
7
  We assert that positive marginal profit from 
spatial arbitrage will be captured in the interre-
gional cash market intercept term (α) defined in 
equation (3). In this case, the intercept term would 
then capture transaction cost and positive eco-
nomic rent paid by SD producers who relied on 
 
7 There is no empirical evidence that the price differential between 
live cattle prices paid in South Dakota and live cattle prices paid in 
Nebraska is greater than the transport and handling cost of delivering 
South Dakota live cattle to the Nebraska market. Barrett and Li (2002) 
discuss a non-competitive outcome as spatial environments where mar-
kets are integrated but not competitive in equilibrium. This type of 
market environment is consistent with the TMH. 
the NE VPR for price discovery. This can be 




V] = E[a]+ E[et]. 
 
  Assume that it is possible to measure profit 
from spatial arbitrage and let βt denote increasing 
positive economic rent from arbitrage occurring 
in the cash market. Incorporating this assumption 
into the cash market equation [equation (3)], 
transaction cost is denoted by and economic rent 






Next, equation (5) is modified first by substitut-
ing in equations (1) and (2) for Pt
M and Pt
V, and 
then by replacing Pt
SD with equation (6): 
 
(7)           E[α+βt+Pt
NE+ψt+εt] – 
   E[Pt
NE+νt]=E[a]+E[et]. 
 
  Taking the realization of the expected value 
components of equation (7), you have a =α+βt. 
Thus, the intercept term of the cointegrating equa-
tion [equation (4)] captures transaction cost and 
increasing economic rent. 
  If long-run economic profit from arbitrage is 
positive and nonstationary, then linear cointegra-
tion techniques would no longer be a robust 
method for estimating the spatial price relation-
ship between interregional markets. The problem 
arises because combining stationary transaction 
cost with nonstationary economic rent from arbi-
trage would render the error term in equation (4) 
nonstationary (Gujarati 2003, p. 805). 
 
 
Empirical Specification of the Spatial 
Relationships: MPR and VPR 
 
Competitive Spatial Equilibrium 
 
The purpose of the MPR and VPR systems is to 
provide an accurate reflection of the transaction 
price information from their respective cash mar-
kets. Spatially linked cash markets are assumed to 
have a spatial relationship that is in equilibrium as 
a result of competitive spatial arbitrage. There-
fore, if information on transaction price in NE is 
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not distorted by a thinning market effect, then the 
information contained in the MPR from SD will 
mirror the information contained in the VPR from 
NE. This implies that in the absence of any mar-
ket distortions, E(et)=0, and Var(et)=σ
2et is con-
stant over time. 
  Empirically, to support this proposition, statis-
tical evidence of a cointegrated relationship be-
tween Pt
M and Pt
V is necessary to conclude that a 
long-run spatial equilibrium exists between the 
cash markets and the associated price-reporting 
systems. A cointegrated relationship between Pt
M 
and Pt
V is present only if et is stationary. Empiri-
cally demonstrating that a long-run competitive 
spatial equilibrium relationship between the SD 
MPR series and the NE VPR series exists is only 
the necessary condition for establishing that the 
NE VPR series provided transparency to the NE 
and SD cash markets. The sufficient condition is 
demonstrating that the SD MPR and NE VPR 
series are spatially integrated. The necessary and 
sufficient conditions must be tested to determine 
whether a thinning market effect had disrupted 
the ability of the NE VPR system to provide 
transparency to the NE and SD cash markets. If 
the necessary and sufficient conditions are con-
firmed, then we can conclude that the NE VPR 
was providing spatial price transparency to par-
ticipants in the SD and NE cash markets for live 
slaughter cattle. 
  However, the literature (Barrett and Li 2002, 
McNew 1996, McNew and Fackler 1997, etc.) 
indicates that linear cointegration techniques are 
inadequate when (i) transaction costs are not sta-
tionary, (ii) trade is bilateral, or (iii) trade is dis-
continuous. For the interregional spatial relation-
ship between SD and NE, only the issue of non-
stationary transaction costs poses a potential prob-
lem. The other two potential caveats are not 
violated by the spatial relationship between the 
SD and NE markets. Empirical results discussed 
later indicate that transaction costs are stationary. 
 
Interregional Spatial Integration and Price 
Transparency 
 
According to the literature (e.g., Barrett and Li 
2002), market integration is defined as the ability 
of linked markets to transfer changes in market 
supply and demand conditions from one market 
to another via the transmission of price shocks, 
commodity movements, or both. Efficient trans-
mission of price shocks is consistent with the 
definition of price transparency as requiring the 
market mechanism to provide accurate and timely 
price information to market participants. 
  To test whether the VPR system provided full 
and accurate transmission of price shocks from 
one region to another in a timely fashion, an er-
ror-correction model (ECM) is proposed. The 
purpose of the ECM is to test the robustness of 
the short-run equilibrium price shock adjustment 
mechanism. This procedure will determine whether 
the MPR series in SD and the VPR series in NE 
are spatially integrated. By adopting the ECM 
framework to model the price transmission proc-
ess across interregional markets, we can also test 
for the econometric anomalies alluded to by the 
TMH. According to Granger (1981, 1983), two 
cointegrated series [equation (4)] can be expressed 






  The change in the equilibrium price of slaugh-
ter cattle from period t–1 to t in SD is ∆Pt
M. The 
change in the equilibrium price of slaughter cattle 
from period t–1 to t in NE is ∆Pt
V. The intercept 
term γ0(γ0=∆a) reflects changes in the long-run 
equilibrium relationship due to the effect of the 
price shock on transaction cost levels.
8 The slope 
parameter γ1(0≤γ 1≤ 1) captures the transmission 
of the price shock occurring in NE, in time period 
t, to SD. If γ1=1, then this would indicate “in-
stantaneous perfect integration” as defined by 
Barrett and Li (2002). However, a weaker condi-
tion discussed by Barrett and Li is “perfect inte-
gration,” which requires only that the entire price 
shock be transmitted without a specific duration-
of-time constraint. The variable et–1 reflects the 
deviation from parity remaining to be transmitted 
from NE to SD as a result of the price shock at 
time t. The deviation from parity adjustment pa-
rameter γ2(0≤γ 2≤ 1) captures the transmission of 
the price shock residual to SD. 
  Empirical estimation of parameters γ0, γ1, and 
γ2 in equation (8) will provide statistical evidence 
of whether the spatial relationship between Pt
M 
 
8 We assume γ 0 = 0. Empirical evidence of γ 0 … 0 indicates that either 
transaction cost or economic rent from arbitrage is nonstationary. In 
this case linear cointegration techniques would be inappropriate. 
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and Pt
V reflected interregional spatial integration 
of the SD and NE cash markets. If γ0 is insignifi-
cant, then the intercept term of the cointegrating 
regression is stationary. This implies that a thin-
ning market effect was not destabilizing the price 
differential between SD and NE cash markets by 
creating opportunities for spatial arbitrage. If both 
γ1 and γ2 are statistically significant, we can con-
clude that the spatial relationships defined by 
equations (1) through (4) are integrated. The im-
plication under this scenario is that the TMH is 








The time period selected for this study is the 19-
month period just prior to federal MPR imple-
mentation. A test for the presence of cointegra-
tion will provide empirical evidence on the nature 
of the spatial relationships defined by equations 
(1) through (4). If a long-run equilibrium rela-
tionship is established, then an ECM modeling 
approach will be used to investigate the short-run 
disequilibrium adjustment process to determine if 
there is empirical evidence of spatial integration 
between regional price-reporting systems. 
  The empirical analysis will begin with unit root 
tests to determine if the selected price series are 
nonstationary. Engle and Granger (1987) state 
that if two series are I(1) then it is possible that a 
linear combination of the two series is I(0). Engle 
and Granger propose a cointegrating regression: 
regressing one I(1) series on another I(1) series. 
The residual series generated by the cointegration 
regression [equation (4)] is tested for the exis-
tence of a unit root to determine if the two price 
series are cointegrated. If the MPR and VPR se-
ries are determined to be cointegrated, then the 
relationship between them can be expressed as an 





In July of 1999, South Dakota Codified Law, 
Chapter 40-15B (SDCL 2000), required that 
mandatory livestock price reporting in South Da-
kota begin on September 1, 1999. All private 
livestock transactions of slaughter animals were 
to be reported to the South Dakota Department of 
Agriculture. Only auction markets were excluded 
from the regulations. Civil and criminal (felony- 
level) penalties were incorporated into the regu-
lations to discourage non-compliance. The De-
partment of Agriculture collected data until fed-
eral mandatory price reporting began. The Secre-
tary of Agriculture’s office supplied all of the 
collected mandatory reporting data used in this 
study.
9 South Dakota mandatory price-reporting 
data were used to construct a daily weighted av-
erage price series for all live weight steer transac-
tions occurring in the state during the 19-month 
period prior to implementation of federal manda-
tory price reporting. The data provide a unique 
opportunity to test if the AMS-VPR system re-
flected actual market conditions during the period 
just prior to the implementation of federal MPR. 
  The South Dakota MPR data set contains 80 
weeks of daily transaction data. There are 142 
transaction days recorded for the direct sale of 
live steers raised in South Dakota. The data set 
contains 59,614 head and 300 recorded transac-
tions.
10 The VPR series selected is the AMS Ne-
braska Daily Direct Weighted Average report. 
The two price series were matched with respect to 
transaction dates. 
 
Empirical Results: Testing for Unit Roots 
 
In Table 1, the Dickey-Fuller (DF) and Aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistics are 
provided for each of the price series. The test 
statistic for detecting the presence of serial cor-
relation is either the Durbin-Watson d or 
Durbin’s  t, depending on whether a lagged de-
pendent variable was needed to whiten the error 
structure of the unit root test. Lagged terms were 
added to the ADF equation until the error struc- 
 
9 In contrast to the dressed weight transaction data used in the study 
by Fausti and Diersen (2004), we use live cattle transaction data. Addi-
tional information on the characteristics of the South Dakota MPR data 
set can be found in the paper by Fausti and Diersen (2004). 
10 The mandatory price-reporting data set supplied to the authors by 
the state of South Dakota contains transaction data on over 600,000 
head of cattle. Dressed weight sales, grid sales, forward contract sales, 
marketing agreement transactions, and heifer and Holstein transactions 
were excluded from the sample. Voluntarily reported price data were 
collected from various issues of the AMS Livestock, Meat and Wool 
Weekly Summary and Statistics report (Agricultural Marketing Ser-
vice, various issues). 
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Table 1. Unit Root Test Results
a 
Price Series  No. of Obs.  Tau Statistics  P-Value 
Nebraska Daily Direct Weighted-Average Report
b 142 -0.80 0.81 
South Dakota Mandatory Price-Reporting Data
c 142 -1.34 0.61 
a Statistical analysis was conducted using SAS (1993). 
b The order of the autoregressive model selected for the ADF test is AR(0). Durbin-Watson d test stat = 1.68. 
c The order of the autoregressive model selected for the ADF test is AR(1). Durbin’s t = -1.27. 
 
 
ture was empirically verified as whitened. The 
unit root tests are based on the null hypothesis 
that a price series has a unit root and is nonsta-
tionary versus the alternative that the series does 
not have a unit root and is stationary. The unit 
root hypothesis test indicates that both price se-
ries are non-stationary (Table 1). 
 
Empirical Results: Testing for Cointegration 
 
Table 2 contains the cointegration results for 
equation (4). The empirical evidence suggests 
that the spatial relationship between the South 
Dakota mandatory price report series and the Ne-
braska direct series reflects a long-run competi-
tive spatial equilibrium relationship existing be-
tween the South Dakota and Nebraska cash mar-
kets. The cointegration results establish the neces-
sary condition for the existence of spatial price 
transparency and the rejection of the TMH. 
  Empirical evidence of the existence of long-run 
equilibrium relationships, however, does not tell 
us anything about short-run deviations away from 
equilibrium. Short-run divergence from the long-
run equilibrium relationship between the price-
reporting mechanisms may result from the sus-
pected flaws in the VPR system. The spatial 
equilibrium literature clearly indicates that inter-
regional integration occurs only if price shocks 
are completely transmitted from one region to 
another. An error-correction mechanism is em-
ployed to investigate the effect of short-run 
anomalies on the long-run relationship just estab-
lished. 
 
Empirical Results: ECM Analysis of Spatial 
Relationship Between MPR and VPR 
 
In the last section we established that there is sta-
tistical evidence of a long-run spatial equilibrium 
relationship linking the South Dakota and Ne-
braska cash markets and the associated regional 
price reports. While the estimated long-run equi-
librium relationships are statistically significant, 
there is still the question of whether price inte-
gration exists across these spatial relationships. 
Sustained short-run deviations would be evidence 
of the failure of the VPR system to act as an effi-
cient mechanism for the transmission of changing 
market conditions to the public. 
 An error-correction modeling procedure is 
therefore utilized with the following set of prem-
ises concerning price determination in the cash 
market for slaughter steers. It is assumed here that 
the equilibrium cash price of slaughter steers is 
determined by regional market conditions outside 
of South Dakota. Packers engaged in the direct 
cash purchase of live slaughter steers in South 
Dakota are aware of the current regional market 
conditions for beef and the transaction costs asso-
ciated with placing South Dakota steers into the 
supply channel. It is also assumed that the trends 
in transaction and transport costs were relatively 
flat during the time period covered by this 
study.
11 Given these assumptions, a price shock to 
the live slaughter steer cash market at the regional 
level will eventually be reflected in the direct 
price paid to South Dakota producers. A price 
shock of x dollars per cwt at time t at the regional 
level will disrupt the long-run equilibrium be-
tween the regional market price and the price paid 
to South Dakota producers. The disequilibrium 
condition will persist until the South Dakota mar-
ket fully adjusts to the price shock in some future 
period t+n, where n is the number of periods 
(transaction days) needed for full adjustment to 
take place. It is during this period of disequilib-
rium that price transparency can be affected. The 
                                                                                    
11 During the period covered by this study, the average Midwest retail 
weekly #2 diesel price per gallon was $1.41 and the standard deviation 
was $0.12 (U.S. Department of Energy 2006). 
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Table 2. South Dakota Mandatory Price Report Cointegration Test Results 
  Cointegration Regression 




Estimate Tau  Statistics P-Value 
SDMPR and NEVPR
a 142 5.14  0.917  -9.27  0.001 
a The order of the autoregressive model selected for the ADF test is AR(0). Durbin-Watson d test stat = 2.025. 
Note: “SDMPR” is South Dakota Mandatory Price Report. “NEVPR” is Nebraska’s voluntary price reporting. 
 
 
length of time (n) it takes for the transmission of a 
price shock opens a window of opportunity for 
profitable arbitrage activities to occur in smaller 
decentralized markets like South Dakota.
12
  Based on the work by Granger (1983), the 
Granger Representation Theorem states that if two 
time-series variables are cointegrated, then the re-
lationship between them can be expressed as an 
error-correction mechanism (ECM). The OLS ver-






where zt is the random error term. The empirical 
estimates for equation (9) are provided in Table 3. 
  The intercept estimate in Table 3 is statistically 
zero. This result answers the caveat raised that a 
thinning market effect could degrade the com-
petitive market environment. This empirical evi-
dence also indicates that transaction costs were 
stationary during the period investigated in this 
study. This suggests that a normal profit from 
spatial arbitrage was being earned in the SD and 
NE cash markets. Therefore we conclude that 
there is no empirical support for the presence of 
anti-competitive practices, such as strategic price 
reporting, affecting the NE and SD cash markets 
during the time period covered by this study. 
  Empirical evidence presented in Table 3 indi-
cates that the slope parameter estimate is highly 
significant and has a p-value of less than .001. 
The “speed of adjustment” parameter estimate is 
also highly significant and has a p-value of less 
than .001. The “speed of adjustment” parameter 
coefficient estimates indicate the proportion of 
the price-shock residual remaining after period t 
that will be transmitted to the SD MPR series in 
                                                                                    
12 The possibility of excess profit potential arising in this type of 
situation has been alluded to by Goodwin and Schroeder (1991) and 
Tomek (1980). 
period t+1. The empirical evidence suggests that 
price shocks occurring in the NE cash market 
were being transmitted to the SD cash market and 
that these price shocks were accurately reflected 
in the NE VPR price series. 
  Market integration occurs when a price shock 
completely passes through from one market to 
another in a timely fashion. When market inte-
gration coexists with competitive spatial equilib-
rium, then the conditions for Barrett and Li’s 
(2000) definition of “perfect integration” are sat-
isfied. According to Fausti and Diersen (2004), 
when interregional spatial markets exhibit perfect 
integration, then spatial price transparency also 
exists within these interregional spatial markets. 
Table 4 provides empirical estimates for the 
speed of adjustment process. 
  The ECM estimates indicate that 94 percent of 
a price shock occurring in the Nebraska cash 
market was transmitted to the South Dakota cash 
market by the next transaction day and 98.5 per-
cent by day two. Empirical evidence provided in 
Table 4 suggests that market integration did exist. 
Thus the sufficient condition for transparency is 
met. 
  The evidence from Tables 2 and 4 supports the 
coexistence of competitive spatial equilibrium 
and market integration. We therefore conclude 
that the South Dakota and Nebraska cash markets 
and the associated price-reporting mechanisms 
meet the conditions for perfect integration and 
that the VPR system did provide spatial price 
transparency to participants in these markets. 
 
 
Conclusions and Summary 
 
It was demonstrated in the theoretical develop-
ment of the empirical model that a significant 
presence of a thinning market effect will distort 
the transmission of the spatial price relationship 
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Table 3. Error-Correction Model OLS Estimates 
  ECM Regression Estimates
a
Price-Series ECM Regressions  No. of Obs.  Intercept Estimate  Slope Estimate 
Speed of Adjustment 
Estimate 
∆SDMPR and NEVPR






a Student t test statistics are given in parentheses below the respective parameter estimate. 
b The first difference variables used to estimate the ECM were screened for serial correlation (DW: 2.042) and stationarity, and no 
diagnostic problems were detected. 
Note: “SDMPR” is South Dakota Mandatory Price Report. “NEVPR” is Nebraska’s voluntary price reporting. 
 
 
Table 4. South Dakota Mandatory Price-Reporting Series: “Speed of Adjustment” Over Time to 
a Price Shock at Time t 
 Time  Period 
Cointegrating Regressions  t  t + 1  t + 2 
SDMPR and NEVPR  75.20%  93.98%  98.52% 




between South Dakota and Nebraska cash mar-
kets being reported by the VPR system for Ne-
braska. The consequence of this distortion is the 
loss of spatial price transparency, as asserted in 
MPR literature. 
  We found no empirical evidence of a thinning 
market effect distorting the voluntary price-re-
porting mechanism for the Nebraska cash market. 
We found no evidence of a noncompetitive mar-
ket environment distorting the South Dakota and 
Nebraska cash markets for live slaughter cattle 
prior to the implementation of federal MPR. 
  For the period when South Dakota required 
mandatory livestock reporting, we did find em-
pirical support for the existence of a spatial rela-
tionship between South Dakota and Nebraska 
cash markets and their respective price-reporting 
regimes for live slaughter cattle that is consistent 
with Barrett and Li’s (2002) concept of “perfect 
integration.” 
  While the analysis covers a small corner of the 
livestock sector, this case study supports the pre-
viously published results of Fausti and Diersen 
(2004) and extends the literature by providing a 
theoretical and empirical framework for modeling 
and testing for the presence of market distortions. 
Our contribution establishes the conditions neces-
sary for a VPR system to provide price transpar-
ency and foster price discovery in cash markets, 
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